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Clower’s volte-face regarding the ‘Keynesian Revolution’1 
Abstract 
Robert W. Clower’s article “The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical Appraisal” 
(1965) was central to the transformation of Keynesian macroeconomics since it contributed to 
the emergence of fixed-price models, in the 1970s. Despite this influence, no scholar has 
proposed to explain its origins. My paper aims to fill this gap. It is argued that Clower came to 
build his disequilibrium program of microfoundations after changing radically his views about 
the meaning and the nature of the ‘Keynesian Revolution’. During a first research phase (1949-
1957), Clower considered that Keynesian macroeconomics was compatible with market 
clearing and with Walrasian microfoundations. But he eventually moved away from these 
equilibrium and synthesis perspectives. During a second research phase (1958-1962), he came 
to conclude that Keynesian macroeconomics had to be rooted in a disequilibrium framework 
and could not be based on Walrasian microfoundations. Hence the existence of a volte-face. 
This volte-face is explained by putting the invariants of Clower’s thought (i.e., his search for 
microfoundations adapted to Keynesian macroeconomics, and his concerns with unstable 
dynamics) in perspective with the contemporary developments in the disequilibrium 
macroeconomics of Don Patinkin, and in the non-tâtonnement economics of Frank Hahn and 
Takashi Negishi.   
JEL Codes:	  B2, D5 
Keywords: microfoundations of macroeconomics, disequilibrium theory, instability of the full 
employment equilibrium, Clower, Patinkin. 
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Introduction 
Robert W. Clower’s article “The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical 
Appraisal” (1965) was central to the transformation of Keynesian macroeconomics since it 
contributed to the emergence of fixed-price models, in the 1970s (Roger Backhouse and Mauro 
Boianovsky, 2013; Michel de Vroey, 2016). This influence is attributable to two ideas. The first 
one was that John Maynard Keynes’ General Theory (1936) should be rooted in a 
disequilibrium framework. Clower (1965) argued that involuntary unemployment meant that 
workers failed to realize their standard optimization plans because of labor market non-clearing. 
The second idea was that the integration of Keynes’ income analysis and Walrasian 
microeconomics was impossible. Clower (1965) stressed that in situations of involuntary 
unemployment, realized income acted as a constraint on workers’ decisions to consume. 
According to him, this was not compatible with the tâtonnement hypothesis and the standard 
theory of the consumer. An alternative microeconomic framework had to be conceived. Clower 
proposed that trade took place out of equilibrium and formulated the famous ‘dual-decision’ 
hypothesis.  
 Economists and historians acknowledged the relationships between Clower’s (1965) 
theoretical propositions and other insights developed either in the non-tâtonnement economics 
of Frank Hahn and Takashi Negishi (1962), or in the disequilibrium macroeconomics of Don 
Patinkin (1956). During the discussion held at the Royaumont conference (where Clower first 
presented the “Counter-Revolution” article), Frank Brechling “regarded Clower’s paper as a 
contribution to the theory of non-tâtonnement” (Hahn and Brechling, 1965: p. 302).2 Negishi 
agreed with him, arguing that in “existing theories of non-tâtonnement, the process of exchange 
was similar to the dual decision” (Hahn and Brechling, 1965: p. 302).3 Later, Robert Barro and 
Hershel I. Grossman (1971) stressed the complementarity between Patinkin’s ‘spill-over’ 
effects and Clower’s ‘dual-decision’ hypothesis: Patinkin (1956) explained that if the market 
for goods did not clear, entrepreneurs would take into account the quantity of goods actually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  In	  1965,	  Hahn	  and	  Brechling	  published	  a	  volume	  gathering	  all	  the	  articles	  presented	  during	  the	  International	  
Economic	  Association	  conference	  held	  from	  03/08/1962	  to	  04/07/1962,	  at	  Royaumont	  (France).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  volume,	  they	  printed	  a	  record	  of	  the	  discussion.	  
3Negishi	  did	  not	  give	  details	  about	  this	  analogy	  between	  non-­‐tâtonnement	  models	  and	  the	  ‘dual-­‐decision’	  theory.	  
Instead,	  he	  stressed	  some	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  to	  model	  non-­‐tâtonnement	  processes.	  In	  particular,	  individuals	  
were	   not	   supposed	   to	   react	   to	   price	   and	   realized	   income	   in	   existing	  models	   of	   non-­‐tâtonnement	   (Hirofumi	  
Uzawa,	  1960;	  Hahn	  and	  Negishi,	  1962):	  “the	  process	  of	  price	  bidding	  by	  excess	  demand	  was	  developed	  not	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  such	  dual	  decisions	  (derived	  from	  the	  distinction	  between	  notional	  income	  and	  realized	  income)	  but	  
on	   the	  basis	  of	  utility	  maximization	   subject	   to	  a	   single	  budget	   constraint	  of	   the	  notional	   income”	   (Hahn	  and	  
Brechling,	  1965:	  p.	  302).	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sold to revise their production plans; Clower (1965) explained that if the labor market did not 
clear, workers would take into account the quantity of labor actually sold to revise their 
consumption plans. According to Barro and Grossman (1971), these two behavioral hypotheses 
could be used to lay the foundations of a “general disequilibrium theory” (1971: p.83). This 
resulted in the seminal fixed-price model. Historians have also focused on the relationship 
between Clower and Patinkin’s insights. Goulven Rubin (2005) argued that Clower (1965) 
borrowed most of Patinkin’s (1956) concepts, Kevin D. Hoover (2012) stressed that like 
Patinkin (1956), Clower’s approach to the microfoundations of macroeconomics consisted in 
elaborating general-equilibrium models that displayed Keynesian features, and Backhouse and 
Boianovsky (2013) presented the 1965 article as an internal criticism of Patinkin’s 
disequilibrium macroeconomics.4 Either way, it is still an issue to understand how Clower 
(1965) came to build his disequilibrium program of microfoundations and to what extent his 
ideas were inspired by the works of Hahn, Negishi, and Patinkin. The present paper addresses 
this issue.  
  Clower’s 1965 article arises out of two research phases. The first phase starts with the 
doctoral dissertation that Clower prepared under Hicks’ supervision at Oxford, from 1949 to 
1952, and ends with the publication of Introduction to Mathematical Economics, in 1957. It 
consists of a project to provide microfoundations to Keynesian macroeconomics, and of a 
project to devise a price theory allowing the unification of all forms of competition (from 
monopoly to perfect competition). During this research phase, Clower was not concerned with 
involuntary unemployment, and more generally, with the issues related to individual 
disequilibrium and its consequences. Moreover, he considered that extensions of the Walrasian 
microeconomic theory were enough to ground Keynesian macroeconomics. In other words, 
Clower defended the equilibrium perspective and the kind of synthesis between Keynesian and 
Walrasian theories that he attacked in the 1965 article. Hence the existence of a volte-face 
concerning the meaning and the nature of the ‘Keynesian Revolution’. 
Clower’s change in perspective took place in a two-step process. In an unpublished 
manuscript titled “Keynes and the Classics: A Reinterpretation” (1958), Clower formulated his 
first disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory. This opened the second research 
phase. Thereafter, Clower came to conclude that the tâtonnement hypothesis and the Walrasian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   According	   to	   Hoover	   (2012),	   economists	   devised	   programs	   of	   microfoundations	   for	   macroeconomics	   long	  
before	   the	   Lucasian	   Revolution.	   Patinkin	   and	   Clower	   would	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   “general-­‐equilibrium	  
program”	  that	  was	  opened	  by	  John	  R.	  Hicks	  (1939)	  and	  that	  culminated	  with	  the	  fixed-­‐price	  models,	  in	  the	  1970s.	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theory of the consumer had to be rejected to leave room for Keynes’ insights in a general-
equilibrium framework. I argue that Clower may have reinterpreted Keynesian 
macroeconomics from a disequilibrium perspective under the influence of Patinkin; and that 
his decision to reject part of Walrasian microfoundations was likely a reaction to the 
contradictions in the disequilibrium macroeconomics of Patinkin (1956, 1958), and a result of 
the confrontation between Clower’s concerns for unstable dynamics and the stability analyses 
led in the non-tâtonnement economics of Hahn and Negishi (1962). 
1. Equilibrium and synthesis perspectives: Phase I (1949-1957) 
Between 1949 and 1957, Clower had two projects: to provide microfoundations to a Keynesian 
business cycle model and to elaborate a price theory capable of unifying all forms of 
competition. Despite their different objectives, these theoretical projects should be considered 
as part of the same research phase. All along the way, Clower considered that Keynesian 
macroeconomics was compatible with market clearing and with Walrasian microfoundations. 
More generally, the issues related to individual disequilibrium and to its consequences were 
never a focal point; and Clower sought to extend Walrasian microeconomics, not to break with 
it. 
1.1 The “general theory of the trade cycle”   
Clower’s first project was to provide microfoundations to a macromodel inspired by 
Keynes (1936) and capable of addressing fluctuations and economic growth à la Roy F. Harrod 
(1939).5 It was outlined in Clower’s doctoral dissertation, Theories of Capital Accumulation 
with Special Reference to their Ability to Explain the Experience of the U.S since 1870 (1952a): 
The writer began by examining the general pure theory of economic behavior 
(as expressed e.g., in Value and Capital) in an attempt to discover whether that 
theory was in any way inadequate as a foundation for capital accumulation 
theory. After making appropriate alterations to the general theory, the writer tried 
to fit various recent theories of capital accumulation [Reference to Keynes 
(1936), Harrod (1939) and Hicks (1950)] into it as special cases (1952a: p. 8). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  presentation	  of	  this	  project,	  see	  “The	  Origins,	  Development,	  and	  Fate	  of	  Clower’s	  ‘stock-­‐
flow’	  general-­‐equilibrium	  program”	  (Plassard,	  2017).	  
5	  
	  
To elaborate his “general theory of capital accumulation”, Clower proposed a 
“reinterpretation” and an “extension of Keynes’s views on the theory of the trade cycle” (1952a: 
p. 11). The “reinterpretation” consisted of explaining fluctuations thanks to the variations of the 
liquidity preference instead of those of the marginal efficiency of the capital (1952a: pp. 80-
83). The “extension” consisted of broadening the liquidity preference theory to physical assets 
(1952a: p. 69). Hence, trade cycles resulted from a capital accumulation process destabilized 
by speculative behavior (1952a: p. 79). Starting from this explanation of fluctuations, Clower 
built a ‘stock-flow’ macromodel. The stock dimension was related to entrepreneurs’ demand 
for the existing stock of capital assets, and accounted for the determination of the real interest 
rate.6 The flow dimension was related to entrepreneurs’ decisions to invest and to produce. And 
the inter-relationship between these two dimensions served to analyze the capital accumulation 
process – depending on the level of the real interest rate, the flow of new investment and the 
flow of depreciation may not match thus leading to variations of the stock of capital assets. 
Clower argued that because of speculative behavior, entrepreneurs’ demand for the existing 
stock of capital assets was subject to violent and repeated changes. This would prevent 
investment, production, and capital assets from reaching stationary positions and, in turn, would 
explain trade cycles (1952a: p. 89). On that basis, Clower made two points. The first one was 
that the instability underlying trade cycles in his macromodel was related structurally to the 
inter-relationship between the stocks and the flows of capital assets. The second one was that 
the same was true in Harrod-type models since the instability was closely related to the 
acceleration principle, a relation linking the rate at which the flow of output was changing with 
the stock of capital assets (1952a: p. 11). Clower concluded that the inter-relationship between 
stocks and flows was the essence of the capital accumulation process.7 Since this inter-
relationship was at the heart of his macromodel, he claimed to have elaborated a “general” 
theory of the trade cycle (1952a: p. 184).    
The challenge was to incorporate the relation of stocks and flows into the standard 
theory of choice and then, to undertake the derivation of Keynes and Keynesian business cycle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   Clower	   was	   concerned	   with	   the	   determination	   of	   real	   magnitudes:	   “Entrepreneurs’	   views	   concerning	   the	  
profitability	  of	  owning	  real	  assets	  [depended	  on]	  the	  relative	  prices	  of	  inputs	  and	  outputs”	  (1952a:	  p.	  68).	  	  	  
7	  “The	  argument	  in	  previous	  chapters	  has	  been	  devoted	  primarily	  to	  demonstrating	  the	  unity	  of	  recent	  theories	  
of	  capital	  accumulation.	  In	  retrospect,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  thread	  which	  links	  together	  various	  theories	  –	  a	  thread	  
that	  is	  hidden	  by	  difference	  in	  method	  and	  content	  –	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  using	  and	  the	  
holding	   of	   assets	   [reference	   to	  Keynes	   (1936)].	   This	  distinction	  obviously	   implies	  but	   it	   is	   not	   implied	  by	   the	  
distinction	   between	   stocks	   and	   flows	   [reference	   to	   the	   models	   following	   Harrod	   (1939)	   and	   Hicks	   (1950)]”	  
(1952a:p.	  184).	  
6	  
	  
models. For that purpose, Clower followed the main lines set out by Hicks in Value and 
Capital.8 He repeatedly referred to the formulation of a general equilibrium model to 
demonstrate the compatibility between economic behavior and aggregate. In his dissertation, 
Clower proposed the ‘producer-consumer’ theory of the firm to ground the ‘stock-flow’ 
architecture. This micromodel was inspired by the works of Leonid Hurwicz (1946) and 
Johannes de Villiers Graaff (1950) and consisted of introducing asset holding into 
entrepreneurs’ programs. Unfortunately, Clower (1952a) failed to offer a full-fledged 
formalization of the related theory of markets. Therefore, the connections between his theory 
of choice and Keynesian macromodels remained essentially informal. This explained at least 
partly why the examiners refused to award him the degree of doctor when he defended his 
dissertation, in May 1952.9 Retrospectively, Clower recognized that his thesis “was not in a 
form fit for publication” and “did not produce what he had hoped”.10 This failure would have 
led him to “develop healthier motivations”, staying “six months at home not only with Value 
and Capital but also with Pareto and Walras”.11 This orientation is confirmed by the publication 
of a series of papers devoted to the development of ‘stock-flow’ market models: “Business 
Investment and the Theory of Prices” (1953), “Productivity, Thrift and the Rate of Interest” 
(1954a), “An investigation into the Dynamic of Investment” (1954b) and “Price Determination 
in a Stock-Flow Economy” (1954c). The last two papers were written with a mathematician 
specialized in dynamics, Donald Bushaw.12 This marked the beginning of a collaboration which 
culminated with the writing of Introduction to Mathematical Economics (1957), a book almost 
fully devoted to ‘stock-flow’ market analyses.  
A ‘stock-flow’ market theory accounted for the determination of prices when 
individuals’ plans to produce and to consume goods in the current market period were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	   For	   an	  exhaustive	  presentation	  of	  Hicks’	  method,	   see	  Roy	  Weintraub	   (1979).	   For	   a	   short	  presentation,	   see	  
Hoover	  (2012).	  
9	  Whilst	  acknowledging	  that	  Clower’s	  microeconomics	  presented	  “some	  undoubted	  contributions	  to	  economic	  
theory”,	  his	  examiners	  (Ian	  M.D.	  Little	  and	  Charles	  M.	  Kennedy)	  deplored	  the	  absence	  of	  “substantial	  connection	  
with	  the	  main	  theme	  of	  the	  dissertation”.	  	  These	  quotations	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  report	  of	  Clower’s	  thesis	  defense,	  
housed	  at	  Oxford	  University.	  Note	  that	  I	  had	  access	  to	  this	  document	  thanks	  to	  the	  help	  of	  Hoover	  and	  to	  the	  
availability	  of	  Simon	  Bailey,	  a	  keeper	  of	  the	  University	  Archives.	  	  
10	   The	   quotes	   are	   taken	   from	   a	   resume	  written	   by	   Clower	   in	   1964.	   R.	  W	   Clower	   Papers,	   Box	   1-­‐2001-­‐0088,	  
Rubenstein	  Rare	  Book	  and	  Manuscript	  Library.	  	  	  
11	  The	  quotes	  are	  taken	  from	  a	  first	  version	  of	  the	  preface	  of	  “Money,	  Markets	  and	  Method:	  Essays	  in	  honor	  of	  
R.W.	  Clower”	  (1999).	  R.	  W	  Clower	  Papers,	  Box	  1-­‐1999-­‐0352,	  Rubenstein	  Rare	  Book	  and	  Manuscript	  Library.	  	  	  
12	   Bushaw	   did	   his	   PhD	   in	   mathematics	   at	   Princeton	   University,	   under	   Salomon	   Lefschetz’s	   supervision.	   He	  
defended	  his	  thesis	  in	  1952.	  According	  to	  Mike	  Kallaher	  (professor	  at	  the	  Washington	  State	  University),	  Bushaw’s	  
dissertation	   contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   modern	   optimal	   control	   theory	   (see:	  
www.math.wsu.edu/Events/bushawobituary.php,	  consulted	  on	  19	  August	  2016).	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distinguished from individuals’ plans to hold goods in stocks, at the end of the market period. 
Formally, on the flow dimension, a set of supply and demand functions described the quantity 
produced and consumed during the current market period. On the stock dimension, Clower 
added a set of supply and demand functions describing the quantity inherited from the activities 
of past market periods and the quantities that individuals wanted to hold in stocks at the end of 
the current market period. On that basis, Clower distinguished two types of equilibria. The first 
one was “temporary” since the stocks available in the economy showed a tendency either to 
rise or to fall. For a given vector of prices, individuals would like to hold stocks of commodities 
different from the one inherited from the past. The stocks would be adjusted by the quantities 
newly produced and consumed in the market period. For that new stock available, a new price 
vector would be set. The process would continue until the quantity of stocks and prices became 
“stationary”. This situation characterized the second type of equilibrium. From 1952 to 1957, 
Clower studied the static and dynamic properties of these models so as to know whether they 
could be used to link the theory of choice developed in the dissertation and Keynesian theories 
of the trade cycle. In the absence of conclusive results, the project petered out. 
Employment fluctuations, individual equilibrium, and tâtonnement dynamics 
Both the ‘stock-flow’ market analyses and the doctoral dissertation are useful to account 
for the equilibrium perspective adopted by Clower in his microfoundational program. Clower’s 
attitude regarding involuntary unemployment indicates that individual disequilibrium and its 
consequences were outside the field of investigation. Clower and Bushaw did not even mention 
the concept in Introduction to Mathematical Economics. From the beginning, Clower (1952a) 
argued that it was not of fundamental importance to know whether workers were voluntarily or 
involuntarily dismissed during the downturn. The effect on economic activity would be the 
same. Accordingly, in the context of trade cycles studies, it would be enough to account for the 
fluctuations of employment: 
In practice, it is clear that large declines in employment may have the same 
influence on economic activity whether workers were voluntarily or 
involuntarily unemployed. We leave the matter at that (1952a: p. 66).    
In spite of this lack of interest in the voluntary/involuntary distinction, Clower (1952a) 
proposed a short reflection on how to incorporate involuntary unemployment in a market 
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framework. He gave emphasis to the form of the labor supply function.13 According to Clower, 
it could be considered that “workers [were] dismissed involuntarily [if] the labor supply curve 
[was] infinitely elastic at the going wage rate” (1952a: p. 66). In other words, it would be 
enough to assume a horizontal labor supply curve to address involuntary unemployment.14 This 
solution implied market clearing and so, that workers realized their standard optimization plans 
(De Vroey, 2004). Therefore, at this stage, Clower viewed involuntary unemployment as an 
equilibrium situation.  
More generally, Clower maintained that Keynesian macroeconomics could be rooted in 
a price theory in which all the markets cleared and so, in which all the individuals realized their 
optimization plans. This appears clearly in the short appendix devoted to the “Keynesian 
system”, in Introduction to Mathematical Economics. Bushaw and Clower aimed at deriving 
the standard IS/LM model from a ‘stock-flow’ price theory where the consumer goods market, 
the capital goods market, the labor market, and the securities market were balanced (1957: p. 
46). This equilibrium perspective is also contemplated in dynamics. While studying the stability 
conditions of the ‘stock-flow’ price theory in discrete time, Bushaw and Clower (1957) insisted 
on the assumption that at any market period, all the markets cleared: 
p₁ (t) and p₂ (t) assume values which make market demand equal to market 
supply at the beginning of each period (1957: p. 84). 
The dynamic path of the economy would be determined by the variations of the stocks of 
commodities in the economy. It was assumed that the stationary equilibrium was reached when 
the net changes of stocks from period to period were nil (1957: p. 84). In continuous time, the 
dynamics was based on the same logic. Following economists such as Lange (1945) and 
Samuelson (1947), Bushaw and Clower studied the stability properties of tâtonnement 
processes (1954c: p. 343; 1957: p. 101). Accordingly, the focus was on the dynamic of abstract 
economies in which disequilibrium transactions were excluded. Individual disequilibrium and 
their consequences were therefore out of the field of investigations in ‘stock-flow’ market 
analyses.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  “One	  has	  to	  make	  a	  series	  of	  assumption	  to	  obtain	  a	  supply	  function	  equivalent	  to	  the	  one	  used	  by	  Keynes	  
(i.e.,	  a	  function	  of	  a	  form	  which	  permits	  one	  to	  talk	  about	  ‘involuntary’	  unemployment)”	  (Clower,	  1952a:	  p.	  66).	  
14	  This	  assumption,	  also	  made	  by	  Franco	  Modigliani	  (1944)	  and	  Oskar	  Lange	  (1945),	  became	  very	  common	  in	  the	  
1950s.	  On	  its	  relevance	  to	  portray	  involuntary	  unemployment,	  see	  Michel	  De	  Vroey	  (2004).	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The compatibility between Walrasian and Keynesian theories 
In the introduction of his dissertation, Clower wondered about the compatibility 
between Walrasian and Keynesian theories. He claimed that the two theories were 
fundamentally compatible. Nonetheless, Walrasian microeconomics needed to be modified to 
ground Keynesian macroeconomics: 
From a formal point of view, is the General Theory a special case of established 
general equilibrium theory? Once again, there are essential differences between 
the two levels of analysis, differences which may not be reconcilable until the 
foundations of general equilibrium theory are broadened (1952a: p. 5).15  
According to Clower, neither Keynes’ theory of investment nor his theory of consumption could 
be linked directly to Walrasian microeconomics. In the former case, this was because the 
standard theory of the firm did not distinguish the holding from the using of assets, and did not 
account for entrepreneurs’ appreciation of the business climate (1952a: p. 71). Hence Clower’s 
decision to broaden standard optimization plans. He proposed the ‘producer-consumer’ theory 
of the firm and showed that the resulting theory of investment “was equivalent to the theory of 
Keynes” (1952a: p. 62).16 In the later case, Clower’s aim was to explain why income was an 
independent variable at the aggregate level while it was not at the microeconomic level (1952a: 
p 64). For that purpose, he aggregated consumers’ optimization plans, drew upon a national 
accounting relation to stress that money consumption depended on money income (1952a: p. 
65), and made a few other assumptions to “arrive at the Keynesian propensity to consume” 
(1952a: p. 65).17 Besides, Clower (1952a) addressed the issue of the compatibility between 
Walrasian and Keynesian theories by discussing the relationship between his microeconomics 
and his “general theory of the trade cycle”. He modified the standard theory of the consumer 
(1952a: p. 226) so as to justify the “floor” and the rising trend of his macromodel. The 
modification consisted of assuming that preferences were interdependent and, in turn, that the 
relative position of consumers in society influenced their patterns of consumption. On that 
basis, Clower considered that the maintenance of the consumption (to keep up with the Joneses) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Clower	  referred	  to	  Hicks’	  Walrasian	   framework	  when	  using	   labels	  such	  as	  “established	  general	  equilibrium	  
theory”	  or	  “standard	  microeconomics”	  (1952a:	  p.	  8).	  	  	  	  	  
16	  For	  further	  details	  on	  Clower’s	  demonstration,	  see	  Plassard	  (2017).	  	  
17	  Clower	  started	  from	  optimization	  plans	  and	  deduced	  aggregate	  versions	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  functions	  by	  
simple	   summation	   (1952a:	   p.	   61;	   p.	   63).	   Clower	   justified	   this	   aggregation	   procedure	   by	   referring	   to	   Hicks’	  
commodity	  theorem.	  The	  theorem	  defined	  the	  conditions	  to	  treat	  the	  aggregate	  as	  an	  individual	  (Hoover,	  2012:	  
p.	  36).	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would underpin the minimum limit of investment at which the economy would rebound. Then, 
since this “floor” was supposed to depend on the stock of capital assets accumulated and that 
this stock was likely to increase over time (1952a: p. 43), a rising trend would be established. 
In parallel, Clower argued that the ‘producer-consumer’ theory of the firm was a relevant 
foundation for the accelerator (1952a: p. 57) and could be used to justify the ‘stock-flow’ 
architecture of his Keynesian business cycle model.18   
Thereafter, Clower developed the ‘stock-flow’ market theory to further his reflection on 
the compatibility between his microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics. The Walrasian 
flavor of the general equilibrium models could hardly be overemphasized.19 Symmetry and 
market clearing characterized the system of equations (1957: p. 46). Moreover, Clower assumed 
that individuals’ decisions were taken simultaneously. Indeed, when Bushaw and Clower 
(1957) gave details on the exchange technology underlying their ‘stock-flow’ price theory, they 
referred to a “central market authority” (1957: p. 31) setting prices so that supplies equaled 
demands (1957: p. 34).  
Though largely implicit, connections with Keynesian macroeconomics were proposed 
both in partial and general equilibrium frameworks. In partial equilibrium, Clower was 
concerned with Keynes’ theory of investment (1954a) and with the liquidity preference theory 
(1954b). Clower (1954b) demonstrated that the dynamic path of the rate of interest was largely 
determined by the excess-stock-demand for bonds, not by the excess-flow-demand for bonds 
(p. 114). This feature was presented as a proof that the rate of interest was governed by 
speculative behavior, not by saving and investment. Then, Clower (1954a) demonstrated that 
given different levels of the rate of interest, the relation between the stock demand and the 
associated level of net investment could be used to obtain “a curve K(r) which Keynes would 
call schedule of marginal efficiency of capital” (p. 76). Besides, in general equilibrium, Bushaw 
and Clower (1954c) referred to the project sketched in the doctoral dissertation. The ‘stock-
flow’ price theory could ground the “models based on the acceleration principle” (1954c: p. 
328). The reason was dynamic. The inter-relationship between stocks and flows was viewed as 
a source of instability ignored in pure stock and pure flow models (1954: pp. 341-342).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	   Clower	   presented	   in	   details	   his	   modifications	   of	   standard	   microeconomics	   in	   two	   papers:	   “Mr.	   Graaff’s	  
Producer-­‐Consumer	  Theory:	  A	  Restatement	  and	  Correction”	  (1952b)	  and	  “Professor	  Duesenberry	  and	  Traditional	  
Theory”	  (1952c).	  
19	  On	  the	  Walrasian	  representation	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  a	  market	  economy,	  see	  De	  Vroey	  (1999).	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In Introduction to Mathematical Economics, Bushaw and Clower recognized that “the 
path from their own (or from any similar model) to the Keynesian system [was] rather tortuous” 
(1957: p. 44). But in the “Keynesian appendix”, their “discussion [served to] show that a path 
exist[ed]” (1957: p. 44). Starting from a disaggregated general-equilibrium model, they made 
various assumptions and modifications to finally deduce the “Keynesian building block Y= 
C+I” (1957: p. 46) and standard Keynesian functions (1957: pp. 46-49). Regardless of the rigor 
of this derivation, this proves that until 1957, Clower considered that Walrasian and Keynesian 
theories were fundamentally compatible.  
1.2 The “general theory of price determination”  
In parallel with his ‘stock-flow’ general-equilibrium program of microfoundations, 
Clower developed a second theoretical project purporting to develop a price theory allowing 
the unification of all forms of competition (from monopoly to perfect competition). It was 
outlined in two unpublished manuscripts, written over the first half of the fifties: “On the 
existence of a General Theory of Price Determination” (c.1954a) and “Toward a General 
Theory of Price Determination” (1955). Then, Clower presented his main developments and 
results in the concluding chapter of Introduction to Mathematical Economics, in three sections 
titled: “Toward a Generalized Theory of Price Determination”, “A Unified Theory of Price and 
Quantity Determination” and “Monopoly and Competition: An Appraisal”. Reflections in this 
area continued until the end of the fifties through unpublished manuscripts and one paper: “On 
the Microdynamics of Price Formation in N-Seller Markets” (c.1958), “A Study of Elementary 
Learning and Response Mechanism in Dynamical Monopoly Model” (1958a), “Inductive 
Inference and Business Behavior” (1959a) and “Some Theory of an Ignorant Monopolist” 
(1959b).20  
Clower’s reading of Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory would 
have been the original impulse. In this book, Robert Triffin took up the criticism of his 
supervisor (Edward H. Chamberlin) on the lack of realism of perfect competition. Triffin 
proposed to integrate some elements associated with monopolistic competition such as strategic 
behaviors and the interdependence of firms, into the Walrasian theory (Maria Cristina 
Marcuzzo, 2012). In the conclusion of his book, Triffin recognized the huge difficulties posed 
by this project and, in turn, maintained that it would be impossible to build a simple, elegant, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  R.	  W	  Clower	  Papers,	  Box	  4,	  Rubenstein	  Rare	  Book	  and	  Manuscript	  Library.	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and general price theory on monopolistic foundations. Such a project had to be viewed as a 
“philosopher’s stone” (1940: p. 289). 
Clower reacted to this conclusion. While developing his ‘stock-flow’ models, he would 
have found the way to complete Triffin’s project via the elaboration of a “general theory of 
price determination”: 
As a result of recent work in the theory of competitive price […] Professor 
Triffin’s dictum no longer has to be accepted. On the contrary, it is now possible 
to exhibit a consistent and unified general theory of price determination 
(c.1954a: p.2) 
The key to understand the project is to acknowledge that whatever the forms of competitive 
structure, the determination of equilibrium prices is based on the same logic. Clower considered 
that individuals (whether a “market authority” embodied by the figure of the broker, a seller, or 
a group of sellers) would try to find equilibrium prices trying to avoid unwanted stocks. Clower 
pointed out that, in perfect competition, brokers were responsible for setting equilibrium prices 
following a tâtonnement process. He concluded that a broker could be viewed “as an actual unit 
of economic decision similar to consumer and business units” (c1954a: p. 31), supposed to set 
prices following an internal equilibrium condition represented by a “desired excess-demand”. 
Clower’s point was that the equilibrium condition of a broker did not match necessarily the 
market one. In this case, the broker would observe unwanted variations of stocks. This would 
be a signal to vary prices. This procedure of revision would occur until the brokers’ “desired 
excess demand” and market excess demand would be simultaneously nil. After having 
presented this procedure of revision of prices, Clower turned to non-competitive structures. He 
argued that, if the assumption of “demand certainty” was dropped, price determination would 
appear to be analogous to the one occurring in perfect competition. In a monopoly, the seller 
decided on the level of production by estimating the price at which he would sell the integrality 
of the production and would maximize his profits. Of course, he may make mistakes, failing to 
correctly anticipate the objective demand. Accordingly, he would be forced to increase his 
stocks of goods or would not be able to exploit all the profit opportunities. To avoid the 
repetition of such scenarios, the seller would revise price until his internal equilibrium coincided 
with the market equilibrium. According to Clower, once this element of uncertainty was 
introduced in the standard monopoly theory, the extension to oligopoly model would be quasi 
natural. The difficulty would lie in the treatment of firms’ interdependences. By showing that 
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price determination was based on the same logic whatever the competition structure, Clower 
thought he had found the way to elaborate a “general price theory” allowing the unification of 
all forms of competition.21  
To undertake this unification, Clower set dynamical systems with various adjustment 
rules describing the behavior of prices, outputs, and realized sales: 
It will now be clear that the more general model is neither competitive nor non-
competitive. Instead, it is a general theory of market adjustment (c.1954a: p. 43). 
The difficulty was to define the adjustment processes in a sufficiently general way to ensure the 
deduction of specific behavior related to the market structures. During the 1950s, Clower sought 
for the best formalization of these adjustment processes. Unfortunately, the complexity of the 
dynamical systems made it difficult to study their stability conditions. Most of the time, 
dynamic analyses were therefore absent. This problem of tractability was put forward by 
Clower to explain why it would be preferable to stick to the assumption of perfect competition 
(1957: p. 190). Since he was unable to find a way to simplify these models, the project petered 
out.  
Disequilibrium was not the issue  
Despite the diversity of models developed by Clower, he always considered situations 
in which “individuals” (whether a “market authority”, a seller, or a group of sellers) set prices 
and made mistakes thus leading to disequilibrium transactions. For example, Clower (1957) 
assumed that independent sellers produced in time (t-1) a homogeneous good that they brought 
to the market in time t. At the beginning of the market period, they set the price at which they 
undertook to deliver the goods during the market period. The market price was supposed to be 
the minimum of the prices set by sellers. Those who set higher prices would not be able to sell 
the quantity they had planned. Symmetrically, consumers would not be able to realize their 
consumption plans when the quantities sold at the market price were not sufficient. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	   Following	   Samuelson	   (1947),	   Clower	   quoted	   Eliakim	  H.	  Moore’s	  Principle	   of	  Generalization	   by	   Abstraction	  
(1910)	  to	  justify	  this	  viewpoint:	  “Until	  a	  short	  time	  ago,	  however,	  neither	  proposition	  was	  ever	  required	  in	  such	  
an	  explicit	   form	  as	   that	   it	   is	  presented	   in	   this	  paper.	  Although	   I	  was	  well	   aware	  of	   E.H.	  Moore’s	  principle	  of	  
generalization	   of	   abstraction,	   therefore	   viz.,	   ‘the	   existence	   of	   analogies	   between	   central	   features	   of	   various	  
theories	  implies	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  general	  theory	  which	  underlies	  the	  particular	  theories	  and	  unifies	  them	  with	  
respect	  those	  central	  features.’	  [footnote	  to	  refer	  to	  Samuelson	  (1947:	  p.	  3)],	  its	  relevance	  to	  the	  case	  in	  question	  
was	  never	  clear.”	  (c1954a:	  p.	  49)	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Accordingly, situations of individual disequilibria were considered in Clower’s “general theory 
of price determination”. 
Yet, three features of these studies show that disequilibrium à la Clower (1965) was not 
the issue. First, in all the papers mentioned, Clower excluded the effects of disequilibrium 
transactions on individuals’ choices by assumption. The sellers could not take into account the 
level of demand during the market period and readjust their production on this basis. Such 
adjustments were considered to be at work but would have consequences only on the next 
market period. Second, Clower considered only a partial equilibrium approach. As a result, he 
ignored the consequences of the non-realization of optimization plans on other markets, what 
Patinkin (1956) called ‘spill-over’ effects. Third, every study was led as if the dynamic 
properties of the models were a secondary issue. Clower set dynamic systems but mainly 
discussed the properties of their equilibria. Of course, this was partly due to the complexity of 
the dynamic systems. But beyond that, a deeper reason, consubstantial with his project, justified 
this approach. The goal was to demonstrate that a single price determination process, with a 
common criterion (supply/demand balance), characterized all forms of competition.22 This 
explains why Clower was mainly concerned with market clearing situations.  
Extension of the “traditional general equilibrium theory” 
Now, let us focus on Clower’s synthesis perspective. In his first manuscript, Clower 
claimed that his “general theory of price determination” was the result of an extension of the 
“traditional” general equilibrium theory: 
The [general] theory follows immediately from generally accepted postulate of 
traditional analysis in conjunction with one simple, almost obvious, further 
assumption which, while already at hand in elementary dynamical 
considerations underlying established analysis, is here utilized for the first time 
(c.1954a: p.2). 
The extension concerned the dynamic procedure of revision of prices implied by the 
tâtonnement hypothesis. To stress the existence of a “general theory of price determination”, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  “Therefore,	  market	  equilibrium	  (in	  monopoly)	   is	  defined	  by	  the	   intersection	  of	  the	  supply	  curve	  s	  with	  the	  
demand	  curve	  d—	  a	  result	  which	   is	  remarquably	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  defines	  market	  equilibrium	  price	   in	  an	  
isolated	  competitive	  market!	  […]	  Here,	  precisely	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  monopoly,	  market	  equilibrium	  is	  defined	  
by	  the	  intersection	  of	  the	  market	  supply	  and	  demand	  curves	  s	  and	  d”	  (1957:	  p.	  189).	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Clower proposed to couple this procedure with the assumption that the Walrasian broker did 
not want to hold unwanted stocks. 
During the development of his project, Clower wondered whether simple extensions of 
Walrasian microeconomics were sufficient to account for the kind of behavior addressed in his 
“general” theory. In 1959, he mentioned the possibility of a break with the “traditional price 
theory”. But he claimed that it was preferable to remain in this established framework: 
The inadequacies of traditional price theory as an instrument for describing 
observed market behavior have become increasingly apparent in recent years. It 
is still an open question, however, whether these shortcomings can be removed 
by appropriate generalizations of existing theories or whether modifications of a 
more fundamental kind will be required. […] It seems to me that both points of 
view entail interesting programs of research and that neither can be said to 
involve anything more than this at the present time.[…] Meanwhile, it is 
interesting to speculate about the possible fruitfulness of an approach which lies 
somewhere between the two extremes. […] The purpose of the present paper is 
to elaborate upon this theme by sketching a simplified “learning model” of 
oligopoly which is broadly consistent with traditional doctrine yet sufficiently 
general to include both established monopoly theory and the accepted theory of 
pure competition as special cases (1959a: p. 2). 
Therefore, Clower considered that his “general theory of price determination” was compatible 
with Walrasian economics.   
To conclude, until 1957 Clower developed two theoretical projects in which he was 
never interested in involuntary unemployment and more generally in individual disequilibrium 
its consequences (e.g., spill-over effects). Moreover, he always considered that extensions of 
“established” general equilibrium theory were sufficient to build his theoretical models. 
Therefore, what happened to him? How does one explain that in little more than three years, at 
the Royaumont conference (1962), he proposed a disequilibrium interpretation of the 
Keynesian theory whilst defending the need to break with Walrasian microeconomics?  
2. Clower’s volte-face: Phase II (1958-1962) 
In 1958, Clower reopened his investigations on Keynesian macroeconomics. In an attempt to 
shed new light on the Keynes-Classics debate, he radically broke with the equilibrium and 
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synthesis perspectives that prevailed until now. As a result, his reflections are considered here 
as part of another research phase (Phase II). Clower’s volte-face took place in two steps. In 
“Keynes and the Classics: A Reinterpretation” (1958) and in “Keynes and the Classics: A 
Dynamical Perspective” (1960), Clower displayed a disequilibrium interpretation of the 
General Theory whilst maintaining that Keynesian and Walrasian theories were compatible. 
Thereafter, he came to conclude that the tâtonnement hypothesis and the Walrasian theory of 
the consumer had to be rejected to leave room for Keynes’ insights in a general equilibrium 
framework. Clower reached this conclusion soon before the Royaumont Conference, where he 
presented a draft of “The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical Appraisal” (1965). The 
origins of such a radical change in perspective are mysterious. But it is clarified by the 
intellectual context and the invariants of Clower’s works.23 Clower probably considered that 
Patinkin’s (1956) disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory opened a fruitful avenue 
of research to address the two very issues on which he was working on since his PhD 
dissertation: the microfoundations of Keynesian macroeconomics and the dynamics of market 
economies. Besides, Clower’s concerns for unstable dynamics may have led him to realize, in 
reaction to Patinkin’s own contradictions and to the developments in non-tâtonnement 
economics, that a break with the Walrasian framework was imperative. In particular, Clower’s 
(1965) decision to reject Walras’ law may be justified on two grounds: Walras’ law was violated 
in the dynamic analysis proposed by Patinkin (1956, chapter XIII), and it was one of the 
necessary conditions to ensure the stability of non-tâtonnement processes in Hahn and Negishi’s 
(1962) model. 
2.1 A two-step reorientation  
Clower (1958) proposed a disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory. The 
main ingredients of disequilibrium economics were mobilized. First, involuntary 
unemployment was the focal point. This concept was viewed as the dividing line between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  intellectual	  context,	  emphasis	  is	  given	  to	  the	  disequilibrium	  macroeconomics	  of	  Patinkin	  
and	  to	  the	  non-­‐tâtonnement	  economics	  of	  Hahn	  and	  Negishi.	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  this	  is	  justified	  since	  Clower	  
started	  interacting	  with	  Patinkin	  as	  early	  as	  1958	  (see	  their	  correspondence	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  stocks	  
and	  flows	  in	  Don	  Patinkin	  papers,	  Box	  25,	  Rubenstein	  Rare	  Book	  and	  Manuscript	  Library).	  In	  the	  later	  case,	  there	  
are	  evidences	  that	  Clower	  followed	  the	  developments	  of	  non-­‐tâtonnement	  models	  in	  the	  early	  1960s.	  At	  that	  
time,	  he	  was	  engaging	  with	  Negishi	  and	  made	  comments	  on	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  “Monopolistic	  Competition	  and	  
General	   Equilibrium”	   (1961:	   p.	   196).	   Then,	   in	   a	   letter	   sent	   to	  Meyer	   Burstein,	   Clower	   referred	   to	   Negishi’s	  
analyses	  of	  non-­‐tâtonnement	  processes:	  “Negishi	  [introduced]	  transaction	  rules	  that	  [were]	  artificial	  and	  [left]	  
prices	  to	  vary	  dynamically	  on	  basis	  of	  desired	  rather	  than	  actual	  [magnitudes]”.	  This	  letter	  is	  undated.	  Yet,	  there	  
are	  strong	  grounds	  for	  believing	  that	  it	  was	  written	  before	  the	  Royaumont	  Conference.	  Indeed,	  Clower	  was	  very	  
vague	  about	  how	  to	  explain	  individuals’	  behaviors	  out	  of	  equilibrium	  (see	  letter	  from	  Clower	  to	  Burstein:	  R.W.	  
Clower	  papers,	  Box	  8,	  Rubenstein	  Rare	  Book	  and	  Manuscript	  Library).	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Keynes and the “Classics”, both in static and in dynamic frameworks. In the former case, 
Clower proposed to follow in Keynes’ footsteps to show that the “Classical point of full 
employment equilibrium” was an “upper limit to possible equilibrium level of employment in 
the Keynesian model” (1958, p.7). Yet, according to Clower “the relative merits of Keynesian 
and Classical [theories could not] be discussed profitably on a static level of analysis” (1958, 
p. 8). That was why he formulated a dynamic interpretation of the Keynes-Classics debate. The 
matter was instability of the full employment equilibrium in Keynes’s theory versus stability in 
the “classical” theory. Second, involuntary unemployment was presented as a disequilibrium 
situation. When Clower sought to account for the “unlimited number of equilibrium states” in 
Keynes’ General Theory, his ambition was to explain that entrepreneurs could set the volume 
of employment whilst leaving the labor market in excess supply (1958, pp. 6-7). Third, Clower 
considered involuntary unemployment as a dynamic phenomenon. The demonstration of its 
persistence through the analysis of market adjustment processes was the aim of his “dynamical 
interpretation” of the Keynes-Classics debate (1958, p. 2). Fourth and finally, Clower intended 
to account for the consequences of disequilibrium transactions. This was suggested through the 
distinction between two scenarios of the dynamic analysis: “Case I: it [was] assumed that all 
market transactions at output prices other than those which ‘clear the market’ [were] strictly 
provisional (i.e., the output market [operated] according to Walrasian or Edgeworthian 
principles). […] Case II [was] rather different for it [rested] upon Keynes’ version of Say’s law; 
i.e., it [depended] on the proposition that “supply [created] its own demand” in the strictest 
possible sense” (1958, p. 9). Here, what Clower called Say’s law in the sense of Keynes meant 
that the model took into account the income constraints imposed on workers’ consumption 
when they failed to sell the quantity of labor planned. By assumption, workers would express a 
demand for goods determined by the level of employment imposed by firms. 
It is striking that whilst developing this disequilibrium interpretation of the General 
Theory, Clower kept maintaining that there was no fundamental difference between Keynes 
and the “Classics”. In 1958, Clower contended that the “Classical equilibrium problem 
[paralleled] that given by Keynes in chapter 2 of the General Theory; in particular, it [was] 
consistent with his treatment in every respect.” And in 1960, he claimed that “the essential 
formal difference between Keynes and the classics [was] more one of subject matter than of 
underlying postulates” (1960: p. 25). Keynes would have been interested in addressing 
“depression states” while the “Classics” would have been interested in addressing equilibrium 
situations. Accordingly, there would be no problem to synthesize the two theories.  
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This position radically changed shortly before the Royaumont conference.24 A letter sent 
to Patinkin on March 1962 is often quoted to show Clower’s break with Walrasian 
microeconomics (Backhouse and Boianovsky, 2013: p. 50; Rubin, 2005: p.18). Here in contrast, 
Clower’s radical reorientation is emphasized drawing from a letter sent to George Delehanty 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology): 
The heart of the problem seems to be that Keynes, unlike the specialists in 
tâtonnement economics, assumes that market excess demands depend in part on 
the level of current transactions (that is to say, income flows). Dependence upon 
income as an independent variable is obviously inconsistent with traditional 
preference analysis since, if income is taken as given it is not possible to define 
factor supply functions. Why this difficulty has not been noticed before I cannot 
say, but I can tell you that it is more difficult to get over than one might suspect 
at first sight. My own proposal is a kind of dual decision theory of the consumer, 
which makes sense in a dynamic context, and happens to include traditional 
preference analysis as a special case – valid under full employment conditions.25 
The argument mentioned was the heart of the 1965 piece. Clower realized that Keynesian 
relations such as the consumption function could not be derived from Walrasian 
microeconomics. This was because realized income was an independent variable in Keynes’ 
theory of consumption while it was not in the Walrasian theory. In the latter, individuals were 
supposed to chose their income when determining their selling and purchasing plans. Income 
was endogenous. No adjustment of consumption was possible unless prices varied. As a result, 
realized income could not act as a constraint in the Walrasian demand for consumption goods. 
For that to be possible, Clower contended that an alternative theory of the consumer was 
required. He proposed the ‘dual-decision’ hypothesis.  
2.2 Why such a volte-face? 
There is a coincidence in time between the emergence of Clower’s disequilibrium 
interpretation of the General Theory and the beginning of his interactions with Patinkin. At the 
end of the fifties, Clower and Patinkin started a correspondence. Initially, Clower reacted to 
“Liquidity Preference and Loanable Funds: Stocks and Flow Analysis” (1958), a paper in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  As	  a	  reminder,	  the	  conference	  took	  place	  from	  03/28/1962	  to	  04/07/1962.	  
25Letter	   from	   Clower	   to	   Delehanty,	   (02/19/1962):	   R.W.	   Clower	   Papers,	   Box	   2,	   Rubenstein	   Rare	   Book	   and	  
Manuscript	  Library.	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Patinkin addressed the validity of Walras’ law in situations of involuntary unemployment. 
Then, the two authors started a new correspondence on monetary theory in reaction to the 
publication of George C. Archibald and Richard G. Lipsey’s paper “Monetary and Value 
Theory: A Critique of Lange and Patinkin” (1958). In this context, Clower repeatedly expressed 
his admiration and his interest for the reasoning developed in Money, Interest and Prices:26 
Re-reading your book, I am more than ever impressed by the consistency of the 
analysis – given the assumptions—and with the absence of anything but minor 
slips.27 
Although Clower referred to the compatibility between the micro and macro parts of 
Money, Interest, and Prices, he did not discuss Patinkin’s unemployment theory during the 
correspondence. Yet, it seems that it was not a simple fact of timing if Clower wrote “Keynes 
and the Classics: A Reinterpretation” at the same moment.28 First, like Clower, Patinkin sought 
to provide microfoundations to Keynesian macroeconomics. And like him too, Patinkin insisted 
on the need to understand the dynamics of market economies. To be more specific, Patinkin 
proposed to explain involuntary unemployment as a dynamic phenomenon. Workers’ inability 
to realize their Walrasian optimizing plans induced pressures on wages which, in turn, provoked 
market adjustments. These were the two points of entry in Clower’s (1958) reconsideration of 
Keynes’ General Theory. In 1958, behind the label “Keynes-Classics debate”, Clower really 
addressed the compatibility between Walrasian and Keynesian theories and the stability of the 
market economy. 
Second, the theoretical proximity between the two authors is undeniable. In 1958, 
Clower nearly paraphrased Patinkin (1956) to criticize Keynes (1936) for having defined 
involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium situation: 
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the matter is the fact that if w and p just 
happen to fall at the same rate of time then, starting from an initial position of 
Keynesian equilibrium (with excess supply in the labor market), the economy 
will remain ‘in equilibrium’ indefinitely although prices and wages are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  See	  Rubin	  (2005:	  pp.17-­‐18)	  for	  other	  quotations.	  
27	  Letter	  from	  Clower	  to	  Patinkin	  (03/10/1959):	  Don	  Patinkin	  Papers,	  Box	  25.	  
28	  Backhouse	  and	  Boianovsky	  (2013)	  acknowledged	  that	  Clower	  and	  Patinkin	  were	  engaging	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
1950s.	  Yet	  their	  analysis	  of	  the	  background	  in	  which	  Clower	  wrote	  the	  1965	  article	  may	  suggest	  that	  Patinkin	  was	  
not	  influential	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  Clower’s	  (1965)	  ideas.	  According	  to	  me,	  Clower’s	  reading	  of	  Money,	  Interest,	  
and	  Prices	  triggered	  his	  reconsideration	  of	  Keynesian	  macroeconomics	  from	  a	  disequilibrium	  perspective.	  
20	  
	  
constantly falling over time! Under these circumstances, it is perhaps natural to 
speak of the difference 𝑁ˢ - 𝑁ᵈ as ‘involuntary unemployment’; but it is a curious 
of language to refer to the situation as a whole as one of equilibrium (1958, p. 
13). 
All, then that Keynes means by the statement that the system may settle down to 
a position of ‘unemployment equilibrium’ is that the automatic workings of the 
system will not restore the system to a position of full employment equilibrium. 
He does not mean ‘equilibrium’ in the usual sense of the term that nothing tends 
to change in the system. All that is strictly in equilibrium is the level—or, 
possibly, only the fact—of unemployment; but there is no equilibrium of the 
money wage rate (Patinkin, 1956: p. 471). 
Likewise, he nearly paraphrased Patinkin to emphasize the need to use dynamics to 
account for Keynes’ theory of involuntary unemployment: 
Although Keynes himself never made a complete transition from statical to 
dynamical modes of thought, his work prompted many of his contemporaries to 
do precisely this, and so wrought a fundamental change in intellectual 
perspective in the space of few years […] The fruits of the Keynesian Revolution 
have been, and are being, gathered primarily by a new generation of economists, 
a generation that has finally accustomed itself to thinking in terms of points and 
planes instead of curves and crosses (1960: p. 323). 
Indeed, it is the very departure from these curves, and the resulting striving of 
individuals to return to the optimal behavior which they represent, which 
provides the motive power of the dynamic process itself. Thus our task in 
studying involuntary unemployment is to free ourselves of the mental habit – 
long ingrained by the methods of static analysis – of seeing only the points on 
the demand or supply curve (Patinkin, 1956: p. 220). 
Lastly, Clower resorted to the logic of the ‘spill-over effect’ in the disequilibrium model 
put forward in 1958. The same mechanism underlined his application of “Keynes’ version of 
Say’s law”. Patinkin described the behavior of entrepreneurs that failed to sell the quantity of 
goods they had planned. They would take into account the level of demand as an additional 
constraint and would redefine their labor demand. Clower described the income constraints 
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imposed on workers’ consumption when they failed to sell the quantity of labor they had 
planned. This was the symmetric effect. 	  
Now, let us explain why Clower eventually considered that the Walrasian and 
Keynesian theories were fundamentally incompatible, a position diametrically opposed to 
Patinkin’s (1956). Rubin (2005) considered that the roots of Clower’s break with the Walrasian 
framework lie in Patinkin’s own contradictions. Whilst studying their positions on the validity 
of Walras’ law, Rubin showed that Patinkin (1956; 1958) preferred contradicting himself rather 
than rejecting the Walrasian framework. Clower (1965) would have identified the gaps and 
would have drawn the consequences that the invalidation of Walras’ law was the sine qua non 
of the Keynesian theory.29 
Rubin’s viewpoint is here reinforced by putting Patinkin’s contradictions in perspective 
with the contemporaneous development in non-tâtonnement economics and with Clower’s 
ambition to account for the instability of market economies, in his disequilibrium theory.  
The dynamics of market economies and, more specifically, the possibility of a long-
lasting depression was core to Clower’s disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory.30 
A disequilibrium model would have to account for i) the rationing suffered by workers in the 
market for labor; ii) workers’ incentive to change the employment situation and the resulting 
pressures on wages; and iii) the dynamic of the whole economy, given that entrepreneurs have 
no interest to modify the employment situation. In this context, Clower insisted on the inability 
of the market system to bring the economy back to the full employment equilibrium.  
In view of Clower’s concerns for unstable dynamics, the contributions of Patinkin 
(1956; 1958) on one side, and of Hahn and Negishi (1962) on the other side, may explain why 
the rejection of Walras’ law became a focal point. In chapter XIII, section II of Money, Interest 
and Prices, Patinkin broke with Walras’ law when he explained the dynamic of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  “Either	  Walras’	  law	  is	  incompatible	  with	  Keynesian	  economics,	  or	  Keynes	  had	  nothing	  fundamentally	  new	  to	  
add	  to	  orthodox	  economic	  theory”	  (Clower,	  1965:	  p.41).	  
30	  “On	  the	  other	  hand,	  any	  point	  which	  lies	  on	  the	  demand	  curve	  but	  above	  the	  supply	  curve	  refers	  to	  a	  state	  of	  
involuntary	  unemployment	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Keynes.	  […]	  Under	  the	  latter	  circumstances,	  the	  marginal	  utility	  of	  the	  
real	  wage	  exceeds	  the	  marginal	  disutility	  of	  labor,	  whereas	  the	  marginal	  product	  of	  labor	  is	  equal	  to	  real	  wage;	  
hence	  households	  alone	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  expand	  employment.	  By	  analogy	  with	  situations	  of	  a	  similar	  sort	  
experienced	  in	  practice,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  regard	  these	  as	  ‘depression’	  states	  of	  the	  model.	  The	  interesting	  thing	  
about	  ‘depression’	  states	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  directly	  plausible	  to	  say	  that	  they	  cannot	  persist	  indefinitely.	  No	  doubt	  
it	   can	  be	  asserted,	  with	  good	   reasons	   that	  any	  particular	   ‘depression’	   state	   tends	   to	  be	   followed	  by	  another	  
‘depression’	  state,	  and	  so	  on,	  indefinitely.	  This	  is	  clearly	  a	  dynamical	  stability	  question”	  (1960:	  p.	  23).	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disequilibrium model. In situation of involuntary unemployment, the excess demands for goods 
and labor were based on notional supplies and effective demands so that their sum (weighted 
by market prices) would be less than zero ([1956] 1965: p. 321). Then, in 1958, Patinkin 
addressed the validity of this law in Keynesian macroeconomics. He realized that the 
formulation of involuntary unemployment as a rationing in the labor market questioned its 
validity. By virtue of this law, it would not be possible to have an excess-supply in the labor 
market without having an excess-demand elsewhere in the economic system:  
Walras’ law relates to an economy in which all markets are in equilibrium. In 
the case of involuntary unemployment, on the other hand, there exists a state of 
excess supply –and hence of continued disequilibrium – in the market for labor. 
At first sight then, there would seem to be no place for the operation of Walras’ 
law (Patinkin, 1958: p. 314). 
In spite of these contradictions with his disequilibrium interpretation of the General 
Theory, Patinkin sought to maintain the validity of Walras’ law. To this end, he assumed that 
workers adjusted passively their labor supply to the demand for labor: 
One way out of this difficulty (there may well be others) is to assume it away by 
attributing to workers a completely passive behavior pattern according to which 
they adjust the amount of labor they plan to supply to the amount employers 
demand at the going wage rate (Patinkin, 1958: p. 314). 
Under these circumstances, “equilibrium always [existed] in the labor market” (1958: p. 314) 
and so, Walras’ law was respected. Patinkin acknowledged that his solution “[dodged] the real 
difficulties” (1958: p. 315). But the problem really was that the very existence of his 
disequilibrium analysis was in question. If the labor market was in “equilibrium”, the dynamic 
pressure supposed to act on wages in situation of involuntary unemployment did no longer exist. 
Accordingly, involuntary unemployment stopped being a dynamic phenomenon and so, 
Keynesian macroeconomics lost its status of disequilibrium theory. In a different way, the 
contemporaneous development in non-tâtonnement economics also emphasized the dynamic 
consequences of keeping Walras’ law valid. Hahn and Negishi (1962) demonstrated that a 
general equilibrium system with disequilibrium transactions but in which Walras’ law held 
good was stable. Clower may have heard about this article before the Royaumont conference 
since he was in touch with Negishi and followed the developments of the non-tâtonnement 
literature. And of course, as a careful reader of Patinkin’s works, he surely noted Patinkin’s 
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contradictions. Accordingly, Clower may have considered that the precondition to account for 
unstable dynamics in a disequilibrium model was to discard Walras’ law. 
It turns out that the theoretical message underlying the 1965 piece was that a break with 
the Walrasian framework was the key to vindicate the Keynesian heterodoxy. Such a view was 
expressed in section II of the “Counter-Revolution” paper, when Clower established a link 
between three “Keynesian indictments”: the instability of the full employment equilibrium, the 
rejection of Walras’ law, and the breaching of the “second postulate” (1965; p. 40). The core 
of the “Counter-Revolution” paper was devoted to the relation between the ‘dual-decision’ 
hypothesis and Walras’ law. Clower demonstrated that the substitution of a “constrained 
demand” to a “notional demand” turned Walras’ equality into an inequality in case of non-
clearing labor market (1965: p. 53).31 This is the best known part of his argumentation, which 
is not the case of the relation between Walras’ law and the instability of the full employment 
equilibrium. Clower contended that its validity entailed the existence of symmetric pressures 
on wage and price so that the return to the full employment equilibrium was ensured (1965: p. 
52). But what would be the dynamic path of the economy if Walras’ law was rejected? To 
answer this question, Clower considered a “typical” Keynesian situation. The labor market was 
in excess supply and the market for goods cleared – workers’ effective demand was supposed 
to match entrepreneurs’ notional supply of goods (1965: p. 54). In these circumstances, Clower 
seemed to consider that the economy might not return to a situation of full employment 
equilibrium: 
The point of the example is merely to illustrate that, when income appears as an 
independent variable in the market excess-demand functions – more generally, 
when transactions quantities enter into the definition of these functions – 
traditional price theory ceases to shed any light on the dynamic stability of a 
market economy (1965: p. 55).	  
Since the disequilibrium theory sketched in the 1965 piece could integrate consistently 
the three main “Keynesian indictments”, Clower firmly believed that he was taking the right 
direction to ground Keynes’ economics.32 That is also why he did not hesitate to reject 
Walrasian microeconomics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Note	  that	  market	  non-­‐clearing	  and	  the	  breaching	  of	  the	  “second	  postulate”	  are	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  
32	   Clower	   ended	   the	   discussion	   of	   his	   article	   at	   the	   Royaumont	   conference	   arguing	   that	   “people,	   including	  
himself,	  had	  failed	  to	  understand	  that	  there	  was	  a	  general	  equilibrium	  interpretation	  of	  Keynes,	  namely	  the	  one	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Conclusion 
My paper aimed to explain the genesis of the “Counter-Revolution” paper. This was a 
difficult task since it entailed solving the mystery which, very often, surrounded Clower’s 
contributions. He was an ambitious economist, asked important questions to understand the 
functioning of market economies, and always provided promising intuitions to answer. But he 
rarely succeeded in formalizing the models that fully supported his views. So, intuitions were 
often put in the back burner. This makes it difficult to reconstitute the logic of his thought. 
Because of that, an archival work was necessary. It helped to reveal the intuitions, the 
intellectual influences, and the aims contemplated.  
The 1965 piece was presented as the result of a volte-face. Clower’s (1965) advocacy 
of a disequilibrium theory and of an alternative to Walrasian microeconomics marked a break 
with the perspectives adopted in his early theoretical projects. There, Clower was not concerned 
with involuntary unemployment, and more generally, with individual disequilibrium and its 
consequences. Moreover, he considered that simple extensions of the Walrasian general 
equilibrium theory were sufficient to undertake the construction of his models. He moved away 
from these positions in a two-step process. In “Keynes and the Classics: A Reinterpretation”, 
Clower offered his first disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory. Then, between 
1960 and 1962, Clower came to conclude that the tâtonnement hypothesis and the standard 
theory of the consumer had to be rejected to ground Keynesian macroeconomics. In view of the 
interactions between Clower and Patinkin at the end of the 1950s, the author of Money, Interest, 
and Prices may have played a key role in the first move. Then, Clower’s decision to reject part 
of Walrasian microfoundations was explained as the result of his ambition to feature unstable 
market adjustment processes, and of his confrontation with both Patinkin’s (1956; 1958) 
contradictions and with the stability analyses led by Hahn and Negishi (1962). These influences 
show that interactions between Walrasian macroeconomics and non-tâtonnement economics 
contributed to the emergence of the search for disequilibrium foundations for Keynesian 
economics.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
he	  had	  developed,	  which	  made	  all	  of	  the	  more	  familiar	  interpretation	  in	  terms	  of	  equational	  inconsistencies,	  rigid	  
wages,	  liquidity	  traps,	  etc.,	  unnecessary	  (Hahn	  and	  Brechling,	  1965:	  p.309).	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